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1. 
History bears the marks of the life of who writes it.  This truism also applies to the 
scholarship of the historian of Renaissance philosophy Paul Oskar Kristeller (1905-
1999).  Moreover, in his scholarly works Kristeller responded, albeit indirectly, to 
what since Nietzsche became a basic ingredient of the Weltanschauung and the 
academic discourses of the German educated middle-class: the perception of a 
Sinnkrise.  By this I mean the widespread apprehension of the crisis of the self, 
meaning, and culture.  While the notion of an all-pervasive crisis resulted in the first 
instance from Germany's rapid industrialization and the experience of the First World 
War and their corollaries, modern technology, mass society and social leveling, the 
history of the 1930s and 1940s could not but exacerbate it for émigré humanists like 
Kristeller, not least because they were victimized by a movement that enlisted many 
of their erstwhile colleagues and almost all of their own students, who convicted 
them of guilt for the crisis, and who triumphantly proclaimed that their expulsion 
marked the end of the crisis. 
There can be no doubt that scholarship in the human sciences is inextricably 
linked to the existential preconditions of the scholar at work.  Thus it contains 
elements of self-reflection of the scholar, or, to put it in hermeneutic terminology, 
each scholarly "expression of life" (Dilthey) also encompasses the autobiography of 
who writes.  References to a level of meaning beyond the topic at hand and towards 
the life of the scholar are also evident in Kristeller's work. This is of particular 
relevance in Kristeller's case, because his career after his departure from Germany 
was advanced not only by Martin Heidegger but also by Giovanni Gentile, giving him 
sponsorship by the two most respected minds among the supporters of fascist 
regimes.  Although the search for elective affinities in a political sense between 
Kristeller and the former is without yield, these special circumstances, and what he 
made of them, will require further attention.   
For the moment, however, let me refer to two details, which indicate the complex 
weave of emigrant life.  After "1968" Kristeller would no longer accept invitations for 
lectures in his native Berlin.  This was not because of the exaggerated violence with 
which the forces of order had reacted to the West German student movement since 
the summer of 1967, but because he "fundamentally disapproved" of the protesters' 
demands for greater participation and the abuse of the academy for political 
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purposes, both at Columbia University, where he was then teaching, and across the 
Atlantic in Europe.1  On the other hand, a few years earlier, Kristeller had become a 
close intellectual friend of Siegfried Kracauer, a writer whose work on film and 
popular culture had earlier brought him far closer to Max Horckheimer's and Theodor 
W. Adorno's Institute for Social Research than to the classical tradition.  It was 
Kristeller rather than Leo Löwenthal or any of the other members of that group 
remaining in the United States who completed, edited and saw through publication 
Kracauer's last, expressly autobiographical book, History. The Last Things before the 
Last.2 
For Kristeller, as for Kracauer and many other émigré humanists, the textual 
space of past ages was not only an object of scholarly inquiry but also source of 
consolation for the drama of the present.3  In his learned narratives one detects 
clues of his identification with one philosophical tradition from antiquity, that is, 
Platonism, and its Renaissance protagonists.  As I intend to show, Platonism was a 
philosophia perennis for Kristeller, that is, the revelation of an immutable and 
enduring, and, one might add, comforting truth, independent of the vagaries of
history.  This was because its rational metaphysics provided a link between class
and modern philosophy, between the Presocratics and Plato on the one hand, an
Kant and Hegel on the other.  While during his academic career Kristeller mostly 
abstained from disclosing this fundamental belief at the heart of his scholarship, in 
1987, more than a decade after he had retired, he admitted its relevance as a source
of comfort and consolation against the catastrophe, which in so many ways 
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ined his life:  
In my long career as a scholar, and in the midst of hard, difficult and 
often disastrous times, this tradition has been a rock of intellectual and 
moral support, much stronger than the numerous fashionable theories 
and ideo
years.4 
In emphasizing the positive legacy of Platonism, Kristeller's scholarship was part, 
albeit in a very specific manner, of a wider "humanistic turn" in German thoug
letters which emerged since the 1930s.  This rediscovery of the "horizons of 
humanism" in the textual space of European history was a counter-move against the
figure of the "cold persona," as developed in anthropological, ethical, and aesthe
discourses of the Weimar Republic in the 1920s.5  These prescriptions for "cool 
conduct," for a culture of distance for the modern self, as expressed for example in
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the anthropology of Helmuth Plessner, the theatre of Bertolt Brecht, and the art of
Neue Sachlichkeit, were themselves a response to the anx
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introduced his anthropology and cultural philosophy to an Anglo-American public: "It 
lture characteristic for the inter-war years in Germany.   
Whereas, as a young person in search of meaning, Kristeller was not attracted to
this mode of modern thinking, he was, like many of his generation, drawn to 
Heidegger's "philosophy of existence," itself a reaction to the contemporary 
experiments in distantiation.  While esteem for Heidegger's early thought, in 
particular for Being and Time, remained a constant throughout his life, during the 
years of emigration his intellectual allegiance shifted to the humanism of Heidegger's 
great philosophical antipode in the 1920s, Ernst Cassirer, the main representative o
the neo-Kantianism of He
wish émigré himself.   
With his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923-29), Cassirer, one of the last 
representatives of the liberal tradition of German-Jewish intellectuals who drew thei
inspiration from the German Enlightenment, attempted to provide a critical cultu
philosophy, meant to address and overcome the all-encompassing Sinnkrise.  
Rooted in the Kantian ideals of rationality and cosmopolitan humanity, Cassirer 
discarded both the pessimistic anthropology of existentialism, as exemplified by 
Heidegger's "Being-in-the-world" as "Being-toward-death," and the impositions of 
Darwinist determinism and that of other extractions.  As opposed to these, Cassirer's 
cultural philosophy was grounded in an anthropology of human freedom.  He defined 
man "in terms of human culture" and pointed to man as "animal symbolicum," that i
to man's unique competence to experience the world mediated by symbolic forms 
th, religion, language, art, history, and science.  In Jürgen Habermas
Cassirer had conceived every content of myth, philosophy, art, and 
language as the world of symbolic forms.  In that world's objective 
spirit, human beings communicated with one another, and in it alone 
were they able to exist at all, for in the symbolic form – as Cassirer 
believed himself capable of saying with Goethe – the inconceivable is 
wrought, the ineffa
to appearance.6   
Since for Cassirer the symbolic forms were the manner in which man, a finite being, 
participated in the infinite, they opened a door towards the liberation of the individual 
from immediacy and anxiety.  To quote from his 1944 An Essay on Man, in which he 
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is symbolic thought which overcomes the natural inertia of man and endows him with 
a new ability, the ability constantly to reshape his human universe."7   
Whereas, during their famous disputation on Kant in Davos in 1929, Heidegger 
declared the latter's philosophy to be a philosophy of finite man, whose access to the 
infinite is denied and whose orientation towards the transcendent simply confirms 
this very finitude, Cassirer idealistically aimed at the terminus ad quem of Kant's 
reasoning, "at liberation through the spiritual form, in science, practical activity, and 
art."8   
One cannot help but think that Cassirer's serene optimism was more congenial in 
aiding a Jewish émigré philosopher from Nazi Germany to cope with his predicament 
than Heidegger's philosophy of Endlichkeit.   
2. 
Born on 25 May 1905, Kristeller was the proverbial "German of Jewish origin," itself a 
symbolic form of great historical significance for the history of Bildung.  His family 
belonged to the well-to-do German-Jewish assimilated bourgeoisie of Berlin.  He 
was brought up by his mother, Alice Magnus, the daughter of a wealthy banker from 
an old Prussian Jewish family, and his stepfather, the paper manufacturer Heinrich 
Kristeller, the only father he knew and whose name he assumed in 1919.9  Deported 
from Berlin after 1941 on one of the Alterstransporte, both of his parents were to die 
in Theresienstadt. 
Alice and Heinrich Kristeller were typical for their generation of the wealthy urban 
upper middle-class of Jewish descent, insofar as they "had no higher education [...] 
but […] respected all cultural pursuits and made many sacrifices to further [his] 
education."10  As Hannah Arendt put it in her famous portrait of Walter Benjamin, 
who came from a similar background, the high regard in which successful 
businessmen like Kristeller senior held the education of their sons "was the 
secularized version of the ancient Jewish belief that those who 'learn' – the Torah or 
the Talmud, that is, God's law, were the true elite of the people and should not be 
bothered with so vulgar an occupation as making money or working for it."11  
However, for the young Kristeller meaning and fulfillment was not to be found in the 
traditions of Jewish culture but in the ideals of German Geist and Bildung.  
Accordingly, he was sent to one of the capital's better public grammar schools, the 
Mommsen-Gymnasium, where the focus was on training in the classical languages.  
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Additionally, he was given piano lessons, at which he excelled to the degree of 
considering a career as a professional musician, as well as private tuition in French 
and English conversation.  In combination with Kristeller's extraordinary talent for 
languages, the latter was to turn out extremely useful in the future.12   
In 1923 Kristeller followed the neo-Kantian philosopher Ernst Hoffmann, his 
teacher of classical Greek, who had been called to a chair in Greek philosophy at 
Heidelberg, to study philosophy, with a specific focus on its history, as well as 
medieval history, mathematics, and art history.  Among his academic teachers at 
Heidelberg were the philosophers Karl Jaspers and Heinrich Rickert and the 
medievalists Karl Hampe and Friedrich Baethgen.  Like most students of the human 
sciences of his social background at that time, he did not content himself with staying 
at one university.  He also spent a couple of semesters at the university in his native 
Berlin and went for a semester to Freiburg to hear Husserl, as well as to Marburg to 
hear Heidegger.  He seriously considered completing his degree with a Ph.D. under 
Heidegger, but eventually settled for a dissertation supervised by Hoffmann, on 
pragmatic grounds, doubtless among others.13  In 1928 he graduated from 
Heidelberg with a thesis on the founder of neo-Platonism, the Greek philosopher 
Plotinus.14   
Like many other German students of philosophy during the 1920s he probably 
believed that in choosing Existenzphilosophie, he would be "riding the crest of the 
philosophy of the future."15 However, Kristeller shied away from committing himself 
completely to Heidegger at that stage of his academic career, for the latter was 
known for throwing obstacles into the path of his doctoral students, thus delaying 
their graduation.  When asked in an interview in the early 1990s what had attracted 
him to Heidegger, to whose house he was also regularly invited because of his skills 
as a classical musician, Kristeller emphasized the latter's brilliance in the exegesis of 
Greek texts and as a historian of philosophy.16   
Because not directly in Heidegger's orbit, he partly side-stepped the dilemma that 
other German-Jewish émigré students of Heidegger like, for example, Hannah 
Arendt and Karl Löwith faced, that is, to reconcile their profound admiration for 
Germany's "greatest philosopher" with his zealous engagement for Nazism as rector 
of Freiburg University in the early 1930s.17  This is not to say that Kristeller did not 
fall under the spell of the "Messkirch magician" (Löwith) at all.  Evidence for his 
fascination with Heidegger is not only that his doctoral dissertation was "an 
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existentialist interpretation" of Plotinus,18 but also that despite of his parents' death at 
the hands of Nazis, he eventually revisited the philosopher and his wife Elfride in 
Germany in 1973.  It can be safely assumed that on that occasion he did not 
demand an apology, let alone an explanation, for Heidegger's involvement with the 
regime.19  Nevertheless, unlike Hannah Arendt, following her first re-encounter with 
her former teacher and erstwhile lover as early as 1950, Kristeller did not simply 
gloss over the matter, if not excuse the "last German romantic" in public, while 
privately blaming Elfride Heidegger for the philosopher's dalliances with Nazism.20  
Kristeller's rationale for re-establishing friendly relations with Heidegger was that the 
latter had behaved "decently" [anständig] towards him after 1933, by, for instance, 
providing him with letters of recommendation and thus facilitating his academic 
career outside Germany.21  This was certainly also the reason, why even during the 
early years of emigration, when external circumstances prevented direct contact 
between them, he continued to thank Heidegger for his original advice and help in 
the acknowledgements to his books.  At the same time, he was quite clear in his 
correspondence that the infamous rectoral speech of 27 May 1933 was "impossible" 
[unmöglich], while everything Heidegger wrote afterwards, including the Letter on 
Humanism, "seemed wrong and confused and also contradicting his own earlier 
philosophy."22   
Kristeller belonged to the generation of Germans born between 1900 and 1910, 
which was marked not only by its relatively high birth rate, but also its generally low 
chances on the stagnating and over-subscribed German labor market of the mid 
1920s.23  Furthermore, while not observant he remained Jewish, and nevertheless 
chose to become an academic.  Theoretically this should have been a matter of 
course, since the Weimar constitution guaranteed full civic equality for all Germans 
regardless of their religious affiliation.  However, in addition to a very limited supply 
of open positions in academia, German scholars of Jewish descent had to cope with 
antisemitism in the ministries and universities.  For Kristeller's career, this had 
negative consequences even before the National Socialists came to power, although 
the crucial decision was not made by an antisemite.  Ernst Hoffmann, who would 
himself be forced into early retirement by the Law for the Restoration of the 
Professional Civil Service of 7 April 1933 as a Jew, refused to supervise his 
Habilitation, because he already had one Jewish student, Raymond Klibansky, under 
 7
his sponsorship and was convinced that the Heidelberg philosophical faculty would 
not accept a second one.24   
After his hopes for an academic future in Heidelberg had been disappointed, 
Kristeller returned to Berlin in order to obtain a further degree in classical philology.  
He studied with Werner Jaeger and Eduard Norden, among others, at Friedrich-
Wilhelms-Universität until 1931 when he passed the Prussian state examination.25  
This exam was the prerequisite for a career as a Gymnasium teacher but left open 
the possibility for a later return to academia.  With this by-way to an academic career 
in mind, Kristeller began to work on a Habilitationsschrift in the summer of 1931 on 
the leading figure of the Florentine Platonic academy, Marsilio Ficino.  The project 
was intended for the Freiburg philosophical faculty, but effectively relied on the 
personal sponsorship of Heidegger.  For obvious reasons, it became impossible to 
conclude in Germany after 1933.   
The story of Kristeller's emigration is quickly told, which is itself an unusual 
circumstance.  Armed with letters of recommendation from Heidegger, Cassirer, 
whom he had come to know through Hoffmann, and other eminent scholars, he first 
immigrated to Italy.  From early 1934 he lived in Rome, conducting extensive 
manuscript research at the Vatican and other Roman libraries and scraping through 
financially with translations and proofreading work provided by the neo-idealist 
philosopher and historian of Renaissance philosophy Giovanni Gentile.  From there 
Kristeller moved to Florence in 1935, where he was lecturer in German at the city's 
second university, the Istituto Superiore di Magistero.26  In the same year Gentile, 
like Heidegger, the most prominent philosopher to endorse the reigning dictatorship 
in his country, organized a temporary position for Kristeller as a lecturer in German 
at the University of Pisa and the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa, where he was 
the director since 1932.27   
Gentile, Minister for Public Instruction in the first Mussolini government and 
"philosopher of fascism," was certainly instrumental in advancing Kristeller's career 
in Italian emigration, employing him also as co-director of the series of unpublished 
or rare humanistic texts with the Florentine publisher Leo S. Olschki, where 
Kristeller's own two-volume edition of Ficino manuscript came out in 1937.28  But 
when the adoption of racial decrees by the Italian government cost Kristeller his post 
in September 1938, not even this powerful member of the fascist establishment 
could protect him.  While Gentile intervened personally on Kristeller's behalf, albeit 
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without consequence, with Mussolini, in order to have an exception made for "this 
poor devil" (questo povero diavolo), he succeeded in organizing a significant sum to 
help him cope financially after the loss of his position.29  As with his most important 
German mentor, Kristeller was once again forced to distinguish between decent 
human behavior towards him and the philosopher's public engagement for the cause 
of his mortal enemies.  Not surprisingly, he would continue to acknowledge the 
importance of Gentile for his own scholarly work but, different from his private 
remarks on Heidegger, he also emphasized the qualities of the former as a liberal 
and tolerant intellectual.30   
In the autumn of 1938, Gentile and a further prominent scholar at Pisa, the 
historian Delio Cantimori, also wrote to American academics in their fields in order to 
find him a position in the United States.31  Among the possible employers was the 
University of Chicago's Classics Department, where Werner Jaeger, who in the 
meantime had left Germany with his Jewish wife, and the Latinist Berthold L. Ullman 
tried to organize a job and a fellowship from the Oberlaender trust.32  More 
promising though were both Kristeller's and his Italian mentors' contacts to the Yale
faculty.  Among those advocating his cause there were Hermann J. Weigand of the 
German Department, the émigré historians Theodor E. Mommsen and Hajo Holbo
and, most importantly in terms of academic power, the church historian and 
Renaissance specialist Roland H
 
rn, 
. Bainton.33   
As early as December 1938 Yale's Department of Philosophy extended an 
invitation to Kristeller to join the faculty for a semester and teach a seminar on 
Plotinus.  However, because the American consulate in Naples needlessly delayed 
the issuing of a non-quota visa for Kristeller for several months, the beginning of his 
American career was postponed until the spring of 1939.34  When his contract at 
Yale expired, he secured a temporary post in the Philosophy Department of 
Columbia University, where he gradually established himself.  While advancement 
through the ranks was initially slow for him, in 1948 he finally received tenure.  In 
1956 he was made full professor and in 1967 he received an endowed chair.  He 
retired in 1972 but continued with his scholarly work until his death in June 1999. 
Despite the danger of underestimating the difficulties Kristeller encountered during 
those years, it is fair to say that compared to other German-Jewish émigré scholars 
he had a relatively smooth transition from Europe to the United States.  This was 
certainly due to the fact that he was well trained, exceptionally gifted, early 
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recognized and well recommended by prominent non-Jews in both philosophy and 
classical philology. These two academic disciplines, in combination, possessed a 
special aura of legitimacy in Germany and Italy, as well as in the United States (with 
German university credentials in these fields having a unique value to the generation 
of academics in positions of power).  He had been well schooled in professional 
flexibility from early on in his career, but this was an experience he shared with many 
of his fellow émigrés, given the exclusionary practices in German academia.  In any 
event, his American career was a "success story" in terms of both scholarly creativity 
and recognition.  As John Monfasani wrote in his obituary: "[His] bibliography seems 
larger than the telephone directory of many small towns."35  He leaves behind a 
large oeuvre as a historian of Renaissance (and classical) philosophy, as an edit
Renaissance philosophical texts, translations and commentaries, and, most 
importantly for future generations of scholars, as an author and compiler of the Iter 
Italicum, a monumental finding aid for Italian Renaissance manuscripts in European 
and American archives and libraries.
or of 
36   
In the latter years of his career Kristeller was showered with academic honors 
both in the United States and Europe, including Germany.  He was presented seven 
homage volumes and received no less than ten honorary doctorates, as well as a 
number of medals and prizes from scholarly academies and learned societies in 
different countries.  To quote Monfasani again: "He may prove to have been, after 
Jacob Burckhardt, the most important student of the Renaissance in modern 
times."37   
3. 
After his arrival at Columbia, Kristeller was at first predominantly concerned with the 
continuation of his studies on the Platonism of the Italian Renaissance.  It is on this 
part of his scholarship – and its direct and indirect connections with Cassirer – that I 
shall concentrate in the following.   
Kristeller first dedicated his energies to publishing an English translation of his 
monograph on Ficino, which he had completed in Italy in 1938.  The book, entitled 
The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, came out in 1943.  It was a historical analysis of 
the entire system of Ficino's philosophy, his metaphysics, psychology, and 
philosophy of religion.38   
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Until this day Marsilio Ficino is best known for two accomplishments: in the first 
instance, for the pivotal role he played in the foundation of the Platonic Academy in 
Florence.  Based on the original academy in Athens of some 1,200 years earlier, this 
was an informal circle of Ficino's friends closely linked to the Medici court, in which 
Plato's philosophy was discussed and through which it was spread among the 
contemporaries.39  Secondly, Ficino is still recognized, because he introduced the 
love theory of Plato's Symposium and Phaedrus to the Renaissance.  While inner 
experience or contemplation was the central concept of Ficino's Platonism, Socratic 
or Platonic love provided the spiritual bond of friendship among the members of the 
academy, that is, the fellowship of those who participated in the contemplative life. 
For Kristeller, of course, Ficino stood for much more than those two 
achievements.  As he wrote in the introduction to his book: 
Ficino's Platonism is not a philosophical conception that just happened 
to appear during the Renaissance, it is, so to speak, the Renaissance 
become philosophical – in other words, the philosophical expression 
and manifestation of its leading idea.40   
What were Kristeller's reasons for this rejection of the historicizing type of 
interpretation prominent since the writings of Burckhardt? Generally speaking, he 
thought it essential to take Ficino's philosophy seriously, on its own terms.  This was, 
firstly, because at the heart of Ficino's Platonic speculation lay a theory of the 
immortality of the soul.  While the belief in immortality as a religious doctrine 
belonged to the standard repertoire of all Christian and Platonic thinkers, Ficino's 
claim that it could be rationally demonstrated was unprecedented.  Secondly, and 
related to this, Ficino developed a doctrine of human dignity which, in contrast to the 
medieval emphasis on God, placed man and man's rational soul at the center of the 
hierarchy of the universe. 
To be sure, Ficino was not a rationalist in the modern sense but firmly rooted in 
his own time.  He had no intention of proclaiming a this-worldly philosophy.  The 
main purpose of his metaphysical speculation was to meet the spiritual needs of 
those who wanted to reconcile their Christian beliefs and the study of classical 
antiquity at the same time.  While he emphasized man's rationality and central role, 
he also demonstrated that even "though Platonic philosophy ha[d] its own authority 
and tradition, it [was] in no way opposed to Christian doctrine and tradition."41  As 
Cassirer put it in his long and very positive review of Kristeller's book: "Personally 
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Ficino was no 'free thinker'.  He did not defend, he did not even conceive the ideal of 
the 'autonomy of reason' or of a secular philosophy.  He never went beyond the 
limits of a 'philosophia pia'."42  Yet he advocated religious tolerance.  To quote 
Cassirer again:  
He strove for a universal religion not for a universal church.  Everyone 
who worshiped and loved God was welcome.  There were no heretics 
in this new religion.  For what is essential in religious life is not any 
dogmatic formula.  According to Ficino the difference between 
formulae, between external signs and symbols, does not endanger the 
unity of faith; on the contrary, it confirms this unity.  This was the 
common conviction of the religious thinkers of the Renaissance.  We 
find it – in almost the same terms – in Nicholas of Cusa's De pace fidei, 
in Ficino's De christiana religione, in Pico della Mirandola's defense of 
the libertas credendi.  "Una veritas in variis signis resplendeat."43   
In a 1960 conference paper on the Platonic Academy Kristeller echoed Cassirer's 
assessment by writing that Ficino's was "a doctrine that advocated harmony and 
tolerance in a period torn by the religious conflicts preceding and following the 
Reformation."44  One can, of course, easily detect the perception of a pre-figuration 
of the religious tolerance ideal, as advocated by German Enlightenment thinkers like 
Lessing, in Cassirer's and Kristeller's words.  But certainly there are other overtones 
as well.  Looking at Kristeller's statement, one wonders whether one could not 
replace some of its key-words with others, so it would read like this: Platonism is a 
doctrine that advocates harmony and tolerance in a period torn by ideological 
conflicts, that is, both before and after the Second World War.  Such an 
interpretation seems legitimate not only in light of the 1987 declaration quoted at the 
beginning of this essay, but also when one considers what Kristeller writes about 
Ficino's central concept of contemplation here.  For the Florentine philosopher, 
contemplation meant "a gradual ascent of the soul towards a highest goal, the direct 
knowledge of god:"  
Everything Ficino says about the virtues and other moral phenomena is 
basically a reduction of moral theory to the life of contemplation.  
Inasmuch as we withdraw into the inner and spiritual life, we escape 
from vices and from the blows of chance, and our actions from there on 
are dictated by a purified knowledge and conscience.  Thus the life of 
contemplation is the goal all human beings must aim at in order to 
attain not only true knowledge but also moral perfection.45   
Is it far-fetched to diagnose more than just a description of Ficino's ideal of 
contemplation at the heart of this statement from 1960? Can one not discern a 
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preference for the life of the mind in Kristeller himself, an escape from the 
cataclysms of the present? This would surely be an understandable response to 
exile, especially coming from an émigré who had successfully withstood the trials of 
Heidegger and Gentile.  Yet this invocation of the somewhat soft neo-humanism 
characteristic of the public face of Cassirer's and Kristeller's American careers does 
not dig very deep. 
For a more conclusive answer, it is worth approaching these questions from a 
different direction.  One can look more broadly at how Kristeller proceeds in his 
scholarship.  In his Ficino book, as well as in his later works, Kristeller was first and 
foremost a historian of textual and intellectual genealogies.  As a philologist he 
focused on the textual transmission of Ficino manuscripts, while as a historian of 
ideas his emphasis here was primarily on the influence, which the Platonic tradition 
exerted on the Florentine philosopher.  Like Cassirer in his own forays into the 
history of ideas and opposed to cultural historians of the Renaissance in the tradition 
of Burckhardt, Kristeller concentrated on the transmission of philosophical thought in 
a relatively narrow sense.   
This went hand in hand with a relative disregard for the wider political and social 
context of Medici Florence within which the philosopher and his Platonic Academy 
were situated.  In his assessment of Ficino's "metaphysics of reason," Kristeller did 
not regard it as a defect that it had an apolitical bent to it, as Ficino "was not 
interested in political problems."46  Moreover, it did not concern him that Ficino's 
metaphysical speculations were only made possible by the patronage of the Medici 
family and that it fitted well with the interests of their authoritarian political regime to 
distract the attention of the population from the affairs of their state between the end 
of the Florentine Republic in 1434 and Savonarola's revolution sixty years later in 
1494. 
Kristeller's focus on philosophy in general and Ficino's neo-Platonism in particular 
also led him to play down the importance of classical humanism, the leading 
intellectual movement, which, according to Burckhardt, had been instrumental in 
setting the Renaissance apart from the Middle Ages.  While Kristeller acknowledged 
that humanism was original to this epoch, the humanists for him were mainly 
representatives of a rhetorical and poetical culture, in short, a literary culture.  Of 
course, these were learned men whose efforts revolved around the revitalization of 
the rediscovered literature and culture of Greece and Rome and the studia 
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humanitatis, grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry, and moral philosophy.  However, in 
terms of earnest metaphysical speculation their contribution was rather limited.  They 
were not to be taken seriously, for their works were 'amateurish' and not adequately 
grounded in reason.  Accordingly, in the introduction to the 1948 The Renaissance 
Philosophy of Man (1948), an edition of important Renaissance texts for American 
students co-edited with Cassirer, Kristeller argued that, as opposed to Petrarch and 
other early humanists, only the representatives of the Florentine Academy, Marsilio 
Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, as well as the Aristotelians in the universities, were 
engaged in "serious if not original metaphysical speculation."47   
Implicit in Kristeller's approach was a twofold challenge: first, to the predominant 
paradigm of German historical scholarship on the Italian Renaissance which 
emphasized the importance of the epoch in terms of universal history as the cradle 
of the modern spirit where the proverbial "discovery of the world and of man" had 
occurred along the lines of Burckhardt.  While Kristeller did not go as far as to 
dismiss the notion of the Renaissance as a separate epoch altogether, he stressed 
the importance of continuities from the Middle Ages, for instance with regards to 
humanist grammar and rhetoric.48  Incidentally, Kristeller's perspective certainly fitted 
well with prevailing trends in American academic scholarship without damaging the 
wider appeals of neo-humanism among the spectators – and funders – of academic 
work, substantially aiding his acceptance in US academia.49   
Secondly, and crucial in terms of finding an answer for the above questions, 
Kristeller in his scholarly work discarded contemporary attempts to instrumentalize 
the humanist tradition for the present.  One example of this from inter-war Germany 
were the vociferous efforts of Kristeller's former academic teacher Werner Jaeger to 
reactivate Greek antiquity against the noisy political conflict of the Weimar Republic.  
In his own version of the "humanistic turn," Jaeger, a conservative classicist who saw 
himself as a semi-political educator, wanted to imbue German politics, society, and 
culture with classical values by way of a "third humanism" (following on from 
Renaissance humanism and German neo-humanism).50  After 1933 initiatives like 
this one, meant to overcome the crisis of culture and meaning of the present, easily 
adapted to offer support for the Nazis, by turning the moral and political ideals of 
Jaeger's protagonists, Plato and Thucydides, on their brutal head.   
For Kristeller, historical anachronisms of this kind were simply unacceptable.  
What were cultural phenomena of the past could only be understood adequately, if, 
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as he put it in a 1962 article, one resisted the "temptation" of emphasizing the 
transhistorical "human relevance of certain problems."51  Against self-declared 
"renovators" of the humanist tradition, of which there was also no shortage in the 
aftermath of the Second World War in Germany and elsewhere, including the United 
States, he insisted on a Kantian notion of pure knowledge and scholarship, 
uncontaminated by the concerns of the present.  Wissenschaft for Kristeller was "the 
problem of universals, the criterion of truth" and "the range of human knowledge, the 
plain facts ascertained by experience and reason [which] cannot be contradicted by 
an appeal to conventional and fashionable opinions."52  For James Hankins, 
Kristeller's "scientific" orientation was due to the influence of one of his Heidelberg 
teachers, the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert.  Like Rickert who had argued that both 
ideographic and nomothetic scholarship were ultimately based on the same cognitive 
model, Kristeller believed "that humanistic research was a science; he always 
regretted that English lacked a word correlative to Wissenschaft in German, which 
permits the assimilation of humanistic to scientific research."53  
Yet political aspects of scholarly disputes were never ruled out by Kristeller.  
Accordingly, he and his peers derided the "third humanism" exported by their 
uncomfortable fellow émigré, Werner Jaeger, and set forth in his history of Greek 
thought Paideia.54  It was expressly criticized and considered dangerously close to 
Nazi ideology.  In 1934 one of his closest friends wrote bitterly to him: "Have you 
read Jaeger's Paideia yet? There are quite funny NS'isms in it!"55  A further friend of 
Kristeller, the émigré art historian Erwin Panofsky at the Institute of Advanced Study 
in Princeton, for whom the translation of the teachings of the Platonic academy into 
High Renaissance art was of crucial importance, once jotted down a list of "old 
jokes." One among them referred to Jaeger in the form of a German nursery rhyme: 
"Der 'dritte Humanismus': Eia, Paideia, was raschelt im Stroh?"56  For Panofsky as 
well, the Nazis were hidden in the straw.   
However, the rejection of anachronistic exploitations of the "classical ideal" did not 
mean that Kristeller and Panofsky maintained that all achievements of history had to 
be relegated to a dead past.  There were indeed traditions from history worth 
preserving for the present.  But, in light of the frequent abuse of the classical 
heritage, one had to tread carefully.  It was crucial which part of the heritage was at 
stake, how and by whom the "rescue effort" was undertaken, and to what end.  
Rather than in the public sphere, the preservation of a deserving tradition had to be 
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conducted in a safe and protected space, among a circle of learned friends 
dedicated to philosophy and removed from the noises and dangers of politics and 
practical life, a place not unlike the Florentine Academy.  In a 1953 speech, entitled 
"In Defense of the Ivory Tower," Panofsky allegorically recommended the following: 
The tower-dwellers, then – whether occupying their towers singly or in 
the company of friends and helpers, masters and apprentices – may 
just as well be content to stay, if they possibly can, where they are and 
to exercise whatever powers of observation, thought and imagination 
God has chosen to bestow upon them; to perfect their techniques of 
work and communication; and, if occasion offers, to "signal along the 
line from summit to summit."  They should try to write or paint or 
compose as best they possibly can, and in so doing they will 
automatically contribute to the making of the world, and perhaps more 
effectively than by climbing down and worshipping projects.57   
Kristeller certainly agreed with this endorsement of the contemplative life, which one 
without doubt could lead at the Institute in Princeton where he himself held 
fellowships twice during his career.   
For both Panofsky and Kristeller one of the "summits," to which the tower-dwellers 
were meant to signal, was the rediscovery of Platonism by the Florentine Academy.  
Renaissance Platonism, as Kristeller put it quite lyrically in the 1948 edition, was "a 
this-worldly religion of the imagination – attractive in contour and wistfully 
reminiscent of another world, like the Platonism of Botticelli's pencil and, like it also, 
thin and disembodied and ever trembling on the verge of the Christian mystery."58   
This bold and deeply personal assertion is the earliest sign that permits an 
extended exploration of a source, which may reveal more about the overlap between 
autobiography and scholarship in his work – the historical inquiries and 
commentaries of Ernst Cassirer, with whom he was closely linked during the first 
decade or so of emigration.  Such overlap inherently creates tensions between the 
strict asceticism of scholarship that Kristeller invoked against the diffuse and 
politically dangerous idealizations of the "third humanism" on the one hand, and, on 
the other, the contribution of scholarship to Kristeller's own search for meaning in 
such cruel times.  Be that as it may, the central role which Florentine philosophy in 
the second half of the fifteenth century played for Kristeller, not just as an object of 
study but also as a source of comfort, will become even more evident if we follow up 
on this connection.   
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4. 
What then were the links? There was, in the first instance, the personal contact, 
which Kristeller and Cassirer maintained during the years of emigration from 1933 
until Cassirer's death in April 1945.  They regularly communicated by way of letters 
and postcards and met frequently once they both reached the United States.  After 
resigning from his professorship in Hamburg even before the Nazi regime could 
force him to do so, Cassirer left Germany and spent the next eight years in England 
and Sweden, first at All Souls College in Oxford and then at Högskala University in 
Göteborg.  He eventually immigrated to the United States in 1941, where he taught 
at Yale until reaching retirement age three years later.  During the academic year 
1944-45 he was a visiting professor in Kristeller's department at Columbia University. 
Faced with the problems of life as a refugee himself, Cassirer nevertheless did 
everything in his power to provide support for younger and less well-known fellow 
émigré humanists like Kristeller.  It was, for example, due to Cassirer's 
recommendation that Kristeller, although living in Italy, obtained a research grant in 
1935 from the London based Academic Assistance Council (renamed to Society for 
the Protection of Science and Learning in 1936), the main British philanthropic 
organization in aid of German-Jewish refugee scholars.59   
Secondly, there was Kristeller's admiration for Cassirer's own exploratory studies 
in his chosen period, most prominently Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie 
der Renaissance, his 1926 book on Nicolaus Cusanus' thought, which was among 
the first to acknowledge the existence of a proper "philosophy of the Renaissance."60  
This made a monograph on Ficino by a historian of philosophy both possible and 
desirable.  For Cassirer, in turn, Kristeller's book filled an important gap in the history 
of philosophy.  He praised it as a work that linked Greek antiquity with the German 
Enlightenment and idealism, Socrates with Kant and Goethe.  As Cassirer pointed 
out in an important 1943 article on Pico della Mirandola, the history he had himself 
uncovered (and to which Kristeller had contributed his highly original work) stretched 
from the neo-Platonists thinkers of antiquity, like Plotinus and Porphyrius, to 
Renaissance Platonists like Cusanus, Ficino, and Pico, to the Cambridge Platonists 
of the seventeenth century and Shaftesbury, and in Germany via Leibnitz to Kant, 
Winckelmann, and Goethe.61   
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Ficino's metaphysical speculation, presented comprehensively for the first time in 
Kristeller's monograph, was particularly relevant, because this effort set the stage for 
Pico's Oration De hominis dignitate, for Cassirer one of the key-texts of the Western 
tradition.  While for Ficino, in truly Platonic fashion, man's excellence still consisted in 
the role man's rational soul played as the center of a hierarchically structured 
universe, his friend Pico took this idea one step further by setting man altogether 
apart from this hierarchy.  His concept of human dignity designated an exceptional 
and privileged position for man, because for Pico man was different from both the 
natural and the spiritual world.  As Cassirer put it:  
This is man's privileged position: unlike any other creature, he owes his 
moral character to himself.  He is what he makes of himself – and he 
derives from himself the pattern he shall follow.62   
Whereas for Ficino, man's likeness and resemblance of God was still dependent on 
divine grace, for Pico it is "an achievement for [man] to work out: it is to be brought 
about by man himself."63  To quote Pico: Man is sui ipsius […] plastes et fictor.  He 
is, in Cassirer's translation, "the 'sculptor' who must bring forth and in a sense chisel 
out his own form from the material with which nature has endowed him."64   
Pico's insistence on human freedom and dignity resonated in Cassirer's own 
thought, as epitomized in An Essay on Man, a pivotal product of his emigration.  In 
addressing the crisis of the modern self – the Sinnkrise that had been the younger 
Kristeller's starting point –, Cassirer was engaged in developing an anthropology of 
freedom.  Its aim was to uncover what he considered to be the true meaning of 
human existence, as against the impositions of Existenzphilosophie and determinism 
prominent during the Weimar years, that is, the liberation of the individual from 
immediacy and anxiety by way of symbolic thought.  In his famous 1929 disputation 
with Heidegger he emphasized the ultimate duty of philosophy "to allow man to 
become as free as possible."65   
If, as Cassirer wrote in An Essay on Man, "[h]uman culture taken as a whole 
[could] be described as the process of man's progressive self-liberation" through 
symbolic forms like language, art, religion and science,66 then the Renaissance and 
its philosophers played a particular role in this process.  In his 1926 book on 
Cusanus he had already interpreted this epoch as crucial for the initiation of modern 
thought.67  In Cassirer's view, Renaissance philosophy rediscovered what classical 
philosophy knew all along, that is, the creative potential of man, man's capacity for 
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symbolic thought.  And Pico, as he wrote in 1943, by engaging with and transforming 
Platonic philosophy, succeeded in liberating himself from anxiety:  
Pico was perhaps the only man in his age completely free from fear of 
demons and from fear of the banefull influence of the stars.  [...] Pico 
knew no such fear, because it contradicted what he felt as the true 
meaning of human existence, and extolled in his great oration as the 
dignity of man.  For him this dignity consists in the fact that the work of 
man is the expression of his own will, not the influence of the stars and 
the gift of higher powers.68 
For Cassirer, then, while the renewal and transformation of Platonism by Cusanus, 
Ficino and Pico marked the beginning of modern thought, their metaphysical 
speculation was inseparably linked with the rediscovery of a promise from antiquity.  
This was the prospect of liberation from the limitations of man's finite existence 
through man's "power to build up a world of his own, an 'ideal' world."69  For 
Cassirer, this legacy from Platonic philosophy was taken up and extended by the 
Enlightenment and German idealism.  And, as his stirring invocation of the themes 
meant to show, it had lost none of its relevance in the twentieth century.70   
While Kristeller never spoke as Cassirer did, as such language would have gone 
against his methodological exclusion of anachronism, I think that I have shown that 
the underlying conception nevertheless shines through his technically much more 
demanding writings on the Florentine Platonic Academy.  Autobiography, the 
personal struggle, leaves the marks of its formative effects.  Before 1987 Kristeller 
comes closest to Cassirer's broader rendering of the meaning of the Platonist 
Renaissance legacy where he admits parenthetically that Platonism for him was 
indeed a philosophia perennis, what Cassirer characterized as "the revelation of an 
enduring Truth, in its main features immutable […] handed down through the ages, 
but generated by no age […], because, as something which eternally is, it is beyond 
time and becoming."71  In the closing, characteristically self-contained sentence of 
his 1960 paper on the Platonic Academy, Kristeller writes: 
Finally, if we are inclined to consider the history of Platonism in the 
West as a kind of philosophia perennis (and I must confess that I share 
this inclination), we shall have to admit that the Florentine Platonism of 
the Renaissance, with all its defects and weaknesses, represents one 
of the most important and most interesting phases in the history of this 
philosophical tradition.72 
It should have become evident that for Cassirer and Kristeller (and Panofsky for 
that matter) the Platonism of the Florentine Academy, with the insistence on 
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tolerance, human dignity and the utopian promise of human freedom that they found 
in it, proved to be a source of comfort and consolation against the catastrophe which 
in so many ways determined the course of their lives.  This was their version of the 
"humanistic turn."  Whatever may have been the rhetorical strategy of Kristeller's 
friend Cassirer in making his philosophical life's work sound in a strange land in the 
hardest of times, Kristeller's pursuit of their shared objectives for the most part 
required a strict, aristocratic withholding of didactic uplift in his utterance.  This self-
denial was no less profound a sign of his intense feelings under conditions of exile 
as were the resonant exhortations of the older, more famous humanist, Cassirer.  
The thought shared among Kristeller, Panofsky, and Kracauer, as expressed long 
after Cassirer was dead, was that the distance that constituted an Academy in the 
modern age of pervasive ideologies and publicity engines could only be sustained by 
the utmost in disinterested attentive accuracy of a kind unimagined by the 
Renaissance masters, so profoundly at home in Florence.  Among these exiled heirs 
of Moses Mendelssohn's initiation of what Habermas called the "abysmal yet fertile 
relationship of the Jews with German philosophy," the philosopher emerged as the 
stranger.  Kristeller could not have gone further away from the activism of his early 
mentors, Heidegger and Gentile.73   
Endnotes 
* I owe many of the ideas for this article to the collaboration with Gerald Hartung on our common 
project Weltoffener Humanismus. Philosophie, Philologie und Geschichte in der deutsch-jüdischen 
Emigration.  Thanks must also go to Oliver Zimmer and Warren Boutcher for their comments, as well 
as to David Kettler and two anonymous readers for their suggestions. 
1 Kay Schiller, Interview with Paul Oskar Kristeller, New York, 4/9/1993. Transcript. 
2 See Siegfried Kracauer, History. The Last Things before the Last (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1969), v-xi. 
3 For other examples see Schiller, Gelehrte Gegenwelten. Über humanistische Leitbilder im 20. 
Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2000) and “Hans Baron’s Humanism.” 
Storia della Storiografia 34 (1998), 51-99. 
4 Paul Oskar Kristeller, Marsilio Ficino and His Work after Five Hundred Years (Florence: Leo S. 
Olschki, 1987), 18. 
5 See Helmuth Lethen, Cool Conduct. The Culture of Distance in Weimar Germany (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2002). 
6 Jürgen Habermas, “The German Idealism of the Jewish Philosophers (1961).” In Philosophical-
Political Profiles (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983), 21-43, 33. 
 21
 
 
7 Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man. An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven, 
London: Yale University Press, 1944), 62.  For a recent assessment of this book in relation to the 
development of Cassirer’s thought both before and during his emigration, see Gerald Hartung, 
“Anthropologische Grundlegung der Kulturphilosophie. Zur Enstehungsgeschichte von Ernst 
Cassirers Essay on Man.” Kulturwissenschaftliche Studien 6 (2001), 2-15. 
8 Hendrik J. Pos, “Recollections of Ernst Cassirer.” In The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer, ed. Paul 
Arthur Schilpp, (Evanston: The Library of Living Philosophers, 1949), 61-72, 67. 
9 Kristeller & Margaret L. King, “Iter Kristellerianum: The European Journey (1905-1939).” 
Renaissance Quarterly 47 (1994), 907-29, 907-10. 
10 Kristeller, A Life of Learning, Charles Homer Haskins Lecture, 26/4/1990 (New York: American 
Council of Learned Societies, 1990), 3. 
11 Hannah Arendt, “Walter Benjamin: 1892-1940.” In Men in Dark Times (San Diego, New York, 
London: Harcourt, Brace & Co.: 1955), 153-206, 179. 
12 Kristeller & King, Iter, 911. 
13 Ibid. 912-5. 
14 Kristeller, Der Begriff der Seele in der Ethik des Plotin (Tübingen: Mohr, 1930). 
15 Richard Wolin, Heidegger’s Children. Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert 
Marcuse (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 12. 
16 Schiller, Interview.  See also James Hankins, "Two Twentieth-Century Interpreters of Renaissance 
Humanism: Eugenio Garin and Paul Oskar Kristeller." In Humanism and Platonism in the Italian 
Renaissance. Collected Studies (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2002), 573-90, 583. 
17 Wolin, Heidegger’s Children, 9. 
18 John Monfasani, “Obituary: Professor Paul Oskar Kristeller.” The Independent, London, 24/7/1999. 
19 Kristeller to M. Heidegger, 9/4/1973, Kristeller Papers [hereafter KP], Box 19, Folder Healey-
Heitmann, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York. 
20 See Elzbieta Ettinger, Hannah Arendt / Martin Heidegger (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1995), 66-82. 
21 See “Empfehlung für Dr. Kristeller, Freiburg 30. April 1933.” In Martin Heidegger, Reden und 
andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges, 1910-1976 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), 
89 and Kristeller & King, 918. 
22 Kristeller to R. de Rosa, 19/12/1987 and 12/1/1986, KP, B. 12, F. de Rosa, Renato. 
23 Detlev J. K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic. The Crisis of Classical Modernity (London: Allen Lane, 
1991), 87-8. 
24 Kristeller & King, Iter, 915.  On Hoffmann's forced retirement see Dorothee Mussgnug, Die 
vertriebenen Heidelberger Dozenten: Zur Geschichte der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität nach 1933 
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1988), 68-9. 
25 Kristeller & King, Iter, 916. 
26 Ibid. 919-20. 
27 On Gentile see Gabriele Turi, Giovanni Gentile. Una Biografia (Florence: Giunti, 1995).  
28 Kristeller, ed. Supplementum Ficinianum: Marsilii Ficini Florentini Opuscula inedita et dispersa, 2 
vols. (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1937). 
 22
 
 
29 G. Gentile to B. Mussolini, 2/9/1938, KP, B. 16, F. Letters to and from G. Gentile concerning P. O. 
Kristeller. 
30 See Turi, “Giovanni Gentile, Oblivion, Remembrance, and Criticism.” Journal of Modern History 70 
(1998), 919-33, 932. 
31 E.g. D. Cantimori to R. H. Bainton, 25/9 and 17/11/1938, Roland Bainton Papers, Record Group 
75, Yale Divinity Library, New Haven, Connecticut and R. H. Bainton to D. Cantimori, 24/10/1938, KP, 
B. 2, F. Letters to and from R. Bainton. 
32 W. Jaeger to Kristeller, 13/10/1938, KP, B. 23, F. Jaeger, Werner and B. L. Ullman to G. Gentile, 
8/9/1938 and to Kristeller, 7/10 and 14/11/1938, KP, B. 51, F. Ullman, B. L.. 
33 Th. E. Mommsen to Kristeller, 11/10/1938, KP, B. 36, F. Modoni-Mommsen, H. J. Weigand to 
Kristeller, 22/9, 30/10, and 12/12/1938, KP, B. 53, F. Weigand, Hermann (1) and R. H. Bainton to G. 
Gentile, 23/12/1938 and 1/1/1939, KP, B. 16, F. Letters to and from G. Gentile concerning P. O. 
Kristeller. 
34 R. H. Bainton to Thomas D. Bowman, American Consul at Naples, 6/1/1939, KP, B. 2, F. Letters to 
and from R. Bainton. 
35 Monfasani, Obituary. 
36 Kristeller, ed. Iter Italicum: Accedunt Alia Itineraria. A Finding List of Uncatalogued or Incompletely 
Catalogued Humanistic Manuscripts of the Renaissance in Italian and Other Libraries, 7 vols. 
(London, Leiden: The Warburg Institute, E.J. Brill, 1963-96). 
37 Monfasani, Obituary. 
38 Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943).  
39 For a thorough historical re-assessment of the academy, its structure, the extent of its membership, 
its tenuous connection to the Medici court and the limited role of Plato in its intellectual life, see 
Hankins, “The Myth of the Platonic Academy of Florence.” Renaissance Quarterly 44 (1991), 429-475.  
40 Kristeller, Philosophy, 23. 
41 Ibid. 27. 
42 Cassirer, “Ficino's Place in Intellectual History.” Journal of the History of Ideas 6 (1945), 483-501, 
489. 
43 Ibid. 490. 
44 Kristeller, “The Platonic Academy of Florence.” Renaissance News 14 (1961), 147-59, 148-9. 
45 Ibid. 152-3. 
46 Kristeller, Philosophy, 15. 
47 Cassirer, Kristeller and John H. Randall, jr., eds. The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (Chicago, 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 5-8.  The edition, which contained philosophical 
texts by Petrarch, Valla, Ficino, Pico, Pomponazzi, and Vives, was already conceived before 
Cassirer's death on 13 April 1945.  Cassirer was originally meant to write the general introduction to 
the volume. 
48 See Kristeller, “Humanism and Scholasticism in the Italian Renaissance.” Byzantion 17 (1944-45), 
346-74. 
49 For the “revolt of the medievalists” under the leadership of Charles H. Haskins, the doyen of 
medieval studies in the United States, against the Burckhardtian image of the Renaissance, see 
Charles H. Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
 23
 
 
Press, 1927).  Kristeller’s approach also fitted well with the “history of unit-ideas,” as advocated by 
Arthur O. Lovejoy, the editor of the Journal of the History of Ideas, founded in 1940.  It only took until 
1943 before he was invited to join its editorial board. 
50 See Suzanne Marchand, Down from Olympus: Archeology and Philhellenism in Germany, 1750-
1970 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 319-30 and Beat Näf, Von Perikles zu Hitler? Die 
athenische Demokratie und die deutsche Althistorie bis 1945 (Bern, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 
1986), 89-92, 187-91. 
51 Kristeller, “Studies on Renaissance Humanism during the last Twenty Years.” Studies in the 
Renaissance 9 (1962), 7-30, 9-10.  
52 Kristeller, “Scholarship, Past and Future.” Typescript, Medieval Seminar at Columbia University, 
13/4/1976, p. 5, KP, B. Columbia University Subject Files 3, F. Columbia University Medieval 
Seminar. 
53 Hankins, Two Twentieth-Century Interpreters of Renaissance Humanism, 584. 
54 See Werner Jaeger, Paideia. Die Formung des griechischen Menschen, 3 vols. (Berlin, Leipzig: de 
Gruyter, 1934, 1944, 1947); translated into English as Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, 3 vols. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1939, 1943, 1944). 
55 “Hast Du schon Jaeger's Paideia gelesen? Es sind ganz lustige NS'ismen drin!” E. Abrahamson to 
Kristeller, 10/4/1934, KP, B. 1, F. Abrahamson, Ernst (1).  
56 Erwin Panofsky, “Alte Witze.” Manuscript, no date, William S. Heckscher Papers, Series II, Folder 
21, The Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities, Santa Monica. 
57 Panofsky, “In Defense of the Ivory Tower.” In Report of the Third Conference, ed. Association of 
Princeton Graduate Alumni (Princeton: no publisher, 1953), 77-84, 81. 
58 Cassirer, Kristeller and Randall, Renaissance Philosophy, 6-7. 
59 Cassirer described his activities on Kristeller's behalf in the United Kingdom in a number of letters 
and postcards to the latter: Cassirer to Kristeller, 21/9/1933, 12/1, 22/4 and 4/5/1934, KP, B. 8, F. 
Cassirer, Ernst.  See also Cassirer to Fritz Saxl, 13/8/1935, General Correspondence, The Warburg 
Institute Archives, London. 
60 See Cassirer, Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (Leipzig: Teubner, 
1926). 
61 Cassirer, “Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. A Study in the History of Ideas.” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 3 (1943), 123-44 and 319-46, 345. 
62 Ibid. 320. 
63 Ibid. 321. 
64 Ibid. 333. 
65 “Protokoll der Davoser Disputation zwischen Ernst Cassirer und Martin Heidegger.” In Martin 
Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 4th 
edition 1973), 246-68, 259. 
66 Cassirer, Essay on Man, 228. 
67 Heinz Paetzold, Ernst Cassirer – Von Marburg nach New York. Eine philosophische Biographie 
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995), 123. 
68 Cassirer, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, 344. 
69 Cassirer, Essay on Man, 228. 
 24
 
70 See Hartung, “Einleitung.” In Cassirer, Die Philosophie der Aufklärung (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 
Reprint 1998), vii-xxiii, xix. 
71 Cassirer, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, 124. 
72 Kristeller, Platonic Academy, 159. 
73 Habermas, German Idealism, 22. 
